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Abstract:- 
The purpose of this article is to celebrate Bob Simpson’s scholarship in 
the field of labour/employment law by pursuing his special interest in 
collective labour law into an aspect of labour/employment law which is 
usually regarded as an individual one, namely that of its personal or 
relational scope.  A first introductory section proposes a normative 
framework for this inquiry, arguing for a more inclusive approach to 
relational scope where collective labour rights are engaged and finding a 
basis for this approach in ILO Recommendation No 198.  A second 
section demonstrates the way in which the relevant jurisprudence of UK 
labour/employment law has seemed to be out of accord with that 
normative approach.  A third section demonstrates how the case-law of 
the ECJ and CJEU has also in its own way been unsympathetic to claims 
that self-employed workers should be brought within the fold of 
collective labour law, particularly with regard to collective bargaining.  A 
fourth section further develops a supranational perspective upon these 
arguments, concentrating on arguments and pronouncements emanating 
from the European Committee for Social Rights.  A fifth section 
considers ways in which novel scenarios of differentiation between 
‘labour’ and ‘capital’ are presenting themselves in the context of the so-
called ‘gig economy’, focusing on the very recent UK Employment 
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Tribunal decision in the Uber case.  A sixth concluding section expresses 
the hope that the article has opened up a largely untrodden path towards 
an authentically collective view of the debate about the personal scope of 
labour/ employment law. (249 words) 
 
1. Introduction 
We are both very pleased to have been given the opportunity to contribute 
to this symposium. 1  The hallmark of Bob Simpson’s scholarship in the 
labour law field has been its high awareness of and sensitivity to the 
collective dimension of employment relations, even when he is writing 
about areas of regulation normally regarded as aspects of ‘individual’ 
employment law, such as the Minimum Wage legislation.  So we 
welcomed the obligation to follow suit and concentrate on that collective 
dimension;   we have found it interesting and, we hope, productive to try 
to do this by shifting the focus of our recurring gaze upon ‘personal 
scope’2 from the individual aspects to the collective aspects of labour law.   
 
The effect of shifting one’s focus in that way is immediately to realise to 
what an extent individual employment law has constituted not merely the 
prime location but actually the engine-room and driver of the ‘personal 
scope of labour law’ discussion, to the effective exclusion of collective 
labour law.  We have a very well-rehearsed and well-developed analytical 
and normative debate about the personal work relations which are and 
                                                 
1 This is an updated and slightly rearranged version of a paper originally presented on 11 October 2013, 
on the occasion of the academic symposium ‘The Changing Face of Collective Labour Law’, organised 
to celebrate the scholarship of Bob Simpson, at the time of his retirement from his long held position at 
the London School of Economics. 
2 In presenting this topic, we begin by enclosing in quotation marks its identification in terms of 
‘personal scope’; this is in order to make the point that our concern is not so much with the persons 
who come within the scope of collective labour law as with the kinds of work relations which fall 
within that scope.  Having made that point, we accept that the terminology of ‘personal scope’ is the 
received and familiar one by which to identify this discussion, so that it is unnecessary to continue to 
distance ourselves from it by treating it as the words of others. 
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should be within the scope of particular aspects of labour law’s 
regulation; but that debate unthinkingly settles upon areas such as unfair 
dismissal law and employment equality law, regarding them, in a way 
which is itself very questionable, as the embodiments of ‘individual 
employment law’ rather than collective labour law.  Our analytical and 
normative perceptions of the personal scope discussion have become very 
largely confined in that way, so that we found when we embarked on this 
topic that we had not really thought through the analytical or normative 
issues of personal scope on the collective side.  In the perception that we 
might not be alone in having suffered from this tunnel vision, we seek to 
make a few observations on the collective aspects of the personal scope 
of labour/employment law which we hope may be slightly unfamiliar 
ones. 
 
Thus when we started concentrating on the collective aspects of personal 
scope, we found ourselves coming up with one or two interesting 
curiosities.  For example, in some aspects at least of UK collective labour 
law a significantly different definition of the ‘worker’ is used from that 
which is used in individual employment law.  The definition of the 
‘worker’ in section 296 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act (‘TULRCA’) is wider than the Employment Rights 
Act (‘ERA’) definition in that it equally begins by extending to all 
contracts for personal work, and equally contains the ‘profession to 
client’ exception but does not contain the further ‘business to customer’ 
exception which the ERA definition – the familiar one – does.3   
 
                                                 
3 See R (British Broadcasting Corporation) v Central Arbitration Committee and another [2003] 
EWHC 1375 (Admin) [2003] I.C.R. 1542. Also cf. the analysis in K. Arita, ‘Legal Concept of“ 
Worker” under Trade Union Law in Britain and Japan’ (2013) The Seinan Law Review, Vol.45, p.41. 
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Then again, if we turn to EU collective labour law, we find that whereas 
EU individual employment law has tended, latterly at least, to distinguish 
reasonably carefully between the ‘worker’ concept and the ‘employee’ 
concept (admittedly treating them as somewhat convergent, but 
nevertheless recognising that they are not one and the same), ‘EU 
collective labour law’ (to the debatable extent that such a concepts exists) 
seems, on occasion at least, to treat the two notions as completely 
synonymous and interchangeable, for example in Article 9 of the Recast 
European Works Councils Directive which speaks of ‘cooperation 
between the central management and  employees’ representatives in the 
framework of an information and consultation procedure for workers’.  
 
We could go further down this trail of excavation for examples of 
difference between collective and individual labour law in the matter of 
personal scope; but it seemed to us more profitable to try to suggest the 
normative framework within which these developments might be taking 
place.  That normative framework might be interestingly different from 
the one upon which we explicitly or implicitly rely when we debate the 
personal scope of individual employment law, if only in the sense that in 
the case of collective labour law, two competing or opposing possible 
normative positions seem to present themselves even more strongly and 
clearly than in the case of individual employment law.  One of those 
possible normative positions points towards a tight confinement of the 
personal scope of collective labour law to dependent employees, the other 
towards a radically more inclusive approach.   It is in that contestation 
that we can see one of the locations in which the issue of the ‘autonomy 
of labour law’ is most crucially at stake. 
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We can perhaps pin down this contestation between two possible 
normative positions in the following way.  The exclusive normative 
framework would be the one which envisages the very purpose and basis 
of collective labour law, even more definitively than for individual 
employment law, as consisting in the redressing, by means of collective 
representation and collective action, of the inequality of bargaining power 
inherent in the subordinate employment contract or relationship.  That 
would point towards seeing dependent employees as exclusively the 
proper subjects of collective labour law.   
 
The inclusive normative framework, by contrast, would be the one which 
envisages the claims which collective labour law vindicates, grouped 
around the core notions of freedom of association and democratic 
representation, as essentially part of or continuous with the embodiment 
of those claims in the general political constitution.  From that normative 
perspective, one might be far less inclined, perhaps even actively 
disinclined, to confine the personal scope of collective labour law 
precisely to subordinate workers, and more inclined to understand 
collective labour law as the manifestation of those general rights and 
freedoms in a more loosely and inclusively denominated domain of work 
relations.   
 
This inclusive normative approach, a purposive or instrumental one, 
might be pursued in various different ways.  The most obvious way to do 
so is to take a specially inclusive approach to the personal scope 
definitions which are embodied in the provisions of collective labour law 
as compared with those which apply to the provisions of individual 
employment law.  That is what seems to have shaped the examples of 
‘stand-out’, or divergent, personal scope provisions which we cited 
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earlier.  Another less obvious way, for which admittedly one has to search 
hard for concrete examples, would be to treat the special need for 
effective protection of workers’ collective rights as requiring a generally 
inclusive approach to the personal scope of labour/ employment law both 
individual and collective.  If this approach were taken, it would not lead 
to differentiation between collective and individual labour law with 
regard to personal scope, but rather to a state of affairs in which the 
normativity of collective labour law formed a leading edge or cutting 
edge in the development of a broadly inclusive approach to personal 
scope in all the domains of labour law.  In both these different modes, 
however, there would still be a tension between this approach and the 
contrastingly exclusive approach to personal scope which seems to find 
its main home or location in the individual employment legislation and its 
interpretation in the courts. 
 
If we accept that there is this underlying normative tension with regard to  
personal scope in the collective sphere, how far and in what ways do we 
think that it manifests itself in the daily life of collective labour law?  The 
answer has to be, we must admit, that it does not do so in very obvious 
ways.  The examples we have given of deviations with regard to personal 
scope definitions between individual and collective labour law speak 
more to its not having been very carefully considered in the collective 
domain than to its having been forged in the heat of legislative or judicial 
debate.  And yet this particular pot does boil, and from time to time 
bubbles of contention break through to the surface.  We proceed to 
consider the development of this contention both in UK law and more 
widely in EU law; but before doing so we reflect upon whether support 
for a purposively inclusive approach with regard to collectively based 
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labour rights can be derived from the norms of international labour law, 
and in particular from the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO. 
 
We suggest that the basis for such an argument is to be found in ILO 
Recommendation No 198 of 2006 concerning the employment 
relationship.  It will be recalled that this Recommendation aimed to set up 
a kind of ‘open method of co-ordination’ process for the continuing 
review and adjustment of national labour laws’ definitions of the personal 
scope of their provisions for the protection of workers: paragraph 1 
enjoined that ‘Members should formulate and apply a national policy for 
reviewing at appropriate intervals and, if necessary, clarifying and 
adapting the scope of relevant laws and regulations, in order to guarantee 
effective protection for workers who perform work in the context of an 
employment relationship.’ Paragraph 2 elaborates that ‘The nature and 
extent of protection given to workers in an employment relationship 
should be defined by national law or practice, or both, taking into account 
relevant international labour standards. (…)’, the Preamble having noted 
‘all relevant international labour standards, especially those addressing 
the particular situation of women, as well as those addressing the scope of 
the employment relationship’ as part of the normative context in which 
the Recommendation was formulated. 
 
The Annotated Guide to the Recommendation, which was issued by the 
ILO in 20074 presented in Annex IV a compilation of the relevant 
international labour standards, giving first priority to the provision of 
Article 2 of Convention 87 of 1948 on Freedom of Association and the 
Protection of the Right to Organise that ‘Workers and employers, without 
                                                 
4 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_dialogue/@dialogue/documents/genericdocument/wc
ms_172417.pdf  (Consulted on 28 October 2016). 
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distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only 
to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their 
own choosing without previous authorisation’ (emphasis added).   We 
know that the framers of Article 2 attached great importance to the 
emphasised words: the Committee of Experts on Freedom of Association 
noted in its Report of 1994 that ‘In adopting the terms “without 
distinction whatsoever”, which it considered a more suitable way in 
which to express the universal scope of the principle of freedom of 
association than a list of prohibited forms of distinction, the International 
Labour Conference emphasized that the right to organise should be 
guaranteed without distinction or discrimination of any kind as to 
occupation, sex, colour, race, creed, nationality or political opinion.’5  
This specially firm insistence on the universal application of the principle 
of Freedom of Association and of the Right to Organise to all workers 
thus forms a significant part of the normative underpinnings of 
Recommendation 198, and should surely be an influence on the formation 
and interpretation of national definitions of the personal scope of labour 
laws, most especially whenever the protection of those fundamental rights 
is at stake.  
 
 
2. The interpretative approach of the courts in UK law 
 
                                                 
5 Report (International Labour Conference), 81st Session, 1994 <3, 3 (pt. 4A, 5), 4 (1)-(2B), 6> 
at paragraph 45, citing the ILO Record of Proceedings of the 30th Session of International 
Labour Conference, 1947, at p.570. 
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It must be said that those hoping to find that any such inclusive purposive 
approach has been taken by the courts of the United Kingdom are in for a 
disappointment.  There are a couple of older decisions which are apt to be 
regarded as manifesting an exclusive approach to personal scope in the 
context of collective labour law, but which turn out on re-examination to 
be equivocal or neutral in that regard.  However,  there is a more recent 
leading case which, to an extent that has not been sufficiently remarked, 
turns out perfectly to represent  the narrow approach, albeit in an almost 
unconscious way.   
 
Thus, the case of Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television 
and Allied Technicians 6 is apt to be remembered for Lord Denning’s 
denunciation of the proposition that the Boulting brothers as the two joint 
managing directors of a film production company could be regarded as 
‘employees’ within the meaning of the membership rule of the defendant 
trade union.  However, it is equally to be recalled that this was rather a 
special case because it concerned the legality of a trade union closed shop 
which the union sought to enforce upon the senior managers of the work-
group in question.  It was decided at a time when closed shop practices 
had not been generally proscribed but were regarded as very 
controversial; and moreover it is specially to be noted that the appeal was 
decided in favour of the trade union, Lord Denning forming the 
dissenting minority in the Court of Appeal. 
 
Somewhat more to the point, though still in its own way rather deceptive, 
was the decision of Plowman J in  Prudential Assurance Co v Lorenz 7 in 
1971. The case concerned industrial action taken by insurance agents 
                                                 
6 [1963] 2 QB 606. 
7 (1971) 11 Knight’s Industrial Reports 78. 
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working for the Prudential who were members of the National Union of 
Insurance Workers; in the course of a dispute over a pay increase, the 
union sent all the agents a circular letter instructing them to withhold the 
submission of weekly accounts (while continuing to bank the premiums 
which they had collected). It was held that the trade dispute immunity  
conferred by section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 upon the inducing 
of breach of contracts of employment in the course or furtherance of a 
trade dispute was strictly confined to obligations arising under the 
contract of employment and did not extend to the fiduciary obligations of 
insurance agents.  Here again, we find that the decision is apt to be 
remembered as manifesting a narrow approach to the personal scope of 
section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act: however, the exclusionary factor 
which operated here seems not to have been that the insurance agents 
were found not to be employees under contracts of employment, but 
rather that their fiduciary obligations to account for the monies they 
collected were not regarded as forming part of the terms of their contracts 
of employment.  This can certainly be regarded as a narrow interpretation 
of section 3, but hardly as concerning the personal scope of that 
provision. 
 
On the other hand, when we turn to the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
in 1983 the case of O'Kelly And Others v Trusthouse Forte Plc 8 we are 
quite undoubtedly concerned with the personal scope of one of the central 
worker-protective provisions of UK employment legislation, namely the 
provision conferring the right not to be unfairly dismissed upon 
employees with the requisite length of contractual employment, of which 
the then prevailing personal scope definition was contained in section 153 
of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.  It remains as 
                                                 
8 [1983] ICR 728.   
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one of the leading cases, arguably the foundational case, in the 
development of a narrowly restrictive approach to the application of that 
personal scope definition to the situation of those working under casual 
work arrangements – in this instance, catering staff working on a casual 
basis for the banqueting department of the defendant hotel company, who 
were known as “regulars” because they could be relied upon to offer their 
services regularly and in return were assured of preference in the 
allocation of available work, but were nevertheless held not to be 
employees working under continuing contracts of employment and 
perhaps not under contracts of employment at all.  The very notable 
feature of the case for the purpose of the present discussion is that, 
although it is clear that the plaintiff workers were alleging dismissal by 
reason of their trade union membership or activity, this crucial collective 
dimension of the facts is mentioned only once in passing9:  there seems to 
have been no suggestion whatsoever that the engagement of this 
fundamental collective right should have commanded a specially 
inclusive approach to the construction of the personal scope provision.   
The negative tradition which was thus instituted seems to have persisted 
in the jusrisprudence of the United Kingdom throughout the intervening 
thirty years.  In the next section of this paper, our attention turns to the 
question of whether any different dynamic is to be found in EU law. 
 
3. Labour law and the regulation of competitive markets – the 
emergence of a new binary divide in EU employment law 
 
                                                 
9 Ackner LJ giving the leading judgment and introducing the history of the appeal says at p 738 that 
 ‘[the appellants] complained that the company unfairly dismissed them from their employment at the 
Grosvenor House Hotel, and that their dismissal was to be regarded as unfair by virtue of section 58 of 
the Act of 1978, that is to say, they were dismissed for an inadmissible reason, the alleged reason for 
the dismissal being that they were members of a trade union and had taken part in its activities’. 
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Probably the best starting point for our inquiry into how, within the 
framework of EU employment law, the ‘binary divide’ between 
employment and self-employment intersects with the normative dilemma  
outlined in the opening section of this paper  is to be found in the analysis 
of three leading decisions of the ECJ or CJEU, the Albany judgment10  , 
the Pavlov judgment11, and the more recent decision in FNV Kunsten12. 
We venture to suggest that, prima facie, Albany and Pavlov provide the 
two antithetical approaches that the CJEU reserves to the exercise of 
collective rights by employees and the self-employed, respectively, with 
FNV Kunsten seemingly offering an attempt to reconcile these 
approaches in respect of working persons with employment statuses that 
struggle to fit the crude binary divide adopted by the Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
Albany introduced an arguably narrow, if adequate, exclusion zone for 
pension funds set up through collective agreements between management 
and labour, from the strictures of EC/EU competition law. While the 
Court noted that it was ‘beyond question that certain restrictions of 
competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations 
representing employers and workers’ it was also willing to concede that 
‘the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be 
seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to [EU 
competition rules] when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve 
conditions of work and employment’ (para 59). This concession was 
                                                 
10 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, [1999] 
ECR I-5751. 
11 Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
Specialisten,  [2000] ECR I-6451. 
 
12 Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden,  [2014] EUECJ C-
413/13 
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premised on various treaty based textual justifications but also on the 
understanding that the ‘nature and purpose’ of the agreement was that of 
‘improving … working conditions, namely … remuneration’ in the form 
of pension benefits (63). The Albany exclusion zone, or ‘Albany 
exception’ (as AG Wahl describes it in FNV Kunsten) was thus created. It 
is worth noting that, as state in the judgment, the exclusion applied to 
what Dutch legislation referred to as ‘second pillar’ schemes, comprising 
‘supplementary pensions provided in the context of employment or self-
employed activity’.13 But it is also worth noting that the exclusion was, 
ultimately, precisely that, a carve-out for collective agreements and an 
implicit restatement that EU competition law was to be regarded as the 
general rule. 
 
 
A few years later, with Pavlov, the Court was eventually confronted with 
the question of whether a compulsory pension scheme set up by the 
representative organisation for the (mainly self-employed) Dutch medical 
profession, could benefit from the ‘Albany exception’. The Court decided 
that ‘such exclusion … cannot be applied to an agreement which, whilst 
being intended, like the agreement at issue in the main proceedings, to 
guarantee a certain level of pension to all the members of a profession 
and thus to improve one aspect of their working conditions, namely their 
remuneration, is not concluded in the context of collective bargaining 
between employers and employees’.14 While the pension scheme 
eventually survived the day, this was not in recognition of its nature or 
the social objectives pursued, but rather in consideration of the fact that it 
                                                 
13 Paragraph 5 of the judgment.  
14 Pavlov, para 68 
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was not perceived as abusing of its dominant position.15 In the view of the 
Court, the scheme could not rely on the Albany exclusion as the Treaty 
did not contain any provisions ‘encouraging the members of the liberal 
professions to conclude collective agreements with a view to improving 
their terms of employment and working conditions and providing that, at 
the request of members of the professions, such agreements be made 
compulsory by the public authorities, for all the members of the 
profession in question’.16  
 
The third piece in this jigsaw is the judgment in the case of FNV Kunsten, 
another Dutch reference. The crux of the reference was the extent to 
which a collective agreement setting terms of employment, including 
minimum fees, for orchestra players offering their services as ‘self-
employed substitutes’,17 was compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU, or 
could benefit instead from the Albany exclusion zone. In this case, the 
Court was adamant that ‘in so far as an organisation representing workers 
carries out negotiations acting in the name, and on behalf, of those self-
employed persons who are its members, it does not act as a trade union 
association and therefore as a social partner, but, in reality, acts as an 
association of undertakings’.18 As such, and with the Treaties being silent 
in respect of the collective bargaining rights of ‘self-employed service 
providers’,19 a collective agreement concluded for the benefit of such 
workers ‘cannot be excluded, by reason of its nature, from the scope of 
Article 101(1) TFEU’.20 However, the Court was open to the possibility 
of applying the Albany exclusion if ‘if the service providers, in the name 
                                                 
15 Pavlov , paras 120-130. 
16 Pavlov, para 69. 
17 FNV Kunsten, para. 8.  
18 FNV Kunsten, para 28 
19 FNV Kunsten, para 29. 
20 FNV Kunsten, para 30.  
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and on behalf of whom the trade union negotiated, are in fact ‘false self-
employed’, that is to say, service providers in a situation comparable to 
that of employees’.21 Having laid out the main principles and 
circumstances under which a person may be classified as a ‘worker’ 
under EU law,22 the Court went on to suggest that it was for the referring 
court to ascertain whether the self-employed service provider musicians 
were in fact ‘false-self employed’ ‘in other words, service providers in a 
situation comparable to that of those workers, that a provision of a 
collective labour agreement’,23 in which case they could benefit from the 
Albany exception. 
 
Contrasting Albany, Pavlov, and FNV Kunsten, it is possible to identify 
three key principles in the Court’s analysis and approach. Firstly, it clear 
that collective agreements are subject to EU competition law and can 
only be exempted from it or -  to use the evocative expression used by 
AG Jacobs in Albany24 – receive a ‘limited antitrust immunity’,  in 
specific circumstances. There is not, in other words, a positive ‘right’ for 
workers and employers’ associations to enter into collective agreements, 
the way for instance it would be understood in some continental legal 
systems, such as the German one, where such a right stems from the 
‘supremacy of a fundamental right to bargain collectively’.25 The Court 
judgment in Albany is admittedly less explicit about this approach than 
AG Jacobs Opinion is. But there is no denying that the Court will not 
apply standard competition law rules only when the ‘nature and purpose 
of the agreement … justify its exclusion from the scope of Article 
                                                 
21 FNV Kunsten, para 31. 
22 FNV Kunsten, paras 33-36. 
23 FNV Kunsten, para 40. 
24 Albany Opinion, para 183. 
25 Albany Opinion, para 110. 
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[101(1)] of the Treaty’,26 by reason of its nature and purpose. The 
purpose has to be that they seek ‘to improve conditions of work and 
employment’.27  
 
Secondly, it is equally clear that the Albany ‘exclusion … cannot be 
applied to an agreement which … is not concluded in the context of 
collective bargaining between employers and employees’28 as the Treaties 
do not contain any provisions ‘encouraging the members of the liberal 
professions to conclude collective agreements with a view to improving 
their terms of employment and working conditions’.29 This qualification 
essentially goes to narrow down the ‘nature’ of collective bargaining to 
agreements concluded between employers and employees, since if the 
members represented by the union are self-employed, then the union will 
be seen as acting as an ‘association of undertakings’30 and, therefore, the 
collective agreement concluded for the benefit of such ‘undertakings’ 
‘cannot be excluded, by reason of its nature, from the scope of Article 
101(1) TFEU’.31 So the ‘binary divide’ presiding over the fault lines 
between collective bargaining and EU competition law is not so much, 
and certainly not only, that between employment and self-employment, as 
that between dependent work and ‘undertakings’, displaying a far more 
polarised structuring of the labour market than the one labour lawyers are 
accustomed to.  
 
Thirdly, and perhaps equally crucially, the Court is prepared to apply the 
Albany exclusion when the self-employed workers or, shall we say, ‘the 
                                                 
26 Albany, para 61. 
27 Albany, 59.  Presumably, collective agreements that have a different purpose would not be covered 
by the exemption. 
28 Pavlov, para 68. 
29 Pavlov, 69. 
30 FNV Kunsten, para 28. 
31 FNV Kunsten, para 30.  
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undertakings’ covered by the collective agreement are, in its view and in 
the view of the referring court, ‘false self-employed’. The Court is open 
to this prospect on the basis that its established jurisprudence accepts that 
‘a service provider can lose his status of an independent trader, and hence 
of an undertaking, if he does not determine independently his own 
conduct on the market, but is entirely dependent on his principal’,32 and 
that in the case of Allonby the it had already held that the formal 
classification of a ‘self-employed person’ under national law ‘does not 
exclude the possibility that a person must be classified as a worker … if 
his independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment 
relationship’.33 What is equally clear, however, is that unions concluding 
collective agreements on behalf of members that are self-employed are 
not excluded from the whim of EU Competition Law, as these workers 
are not recognised any bargaining rights by the Treaties and, according to 
the Court, are better understood and conceptualised as ‘undertakings’. 
 
To sum up, according to the CJEU, the ability of self-employed workers 
to receive union representation for the purposes of collective bargaining 
processes aiming at improving their terms and conditions of employment 
flounders on three main obstacles: the absence of a rights based approach 
in respect of protecting collective bargaining either as a constitutional or 
as a fundamental right; the alleged absence from the Treaties of a right to 
bargain collectively for workers that are not employees; the very strict 
binary divide between dependent workers on the one hand and self-
employed service providers, on the other, with the latter category being 
invariably classified as ‘undertakings’. The only apparent concession the 
Court is willing to make is for some false self-employed to be reclassified 
                                                 
32 FNV Kunsten, para 33, with an explicit reference to its judgment in Case C-217/05 
33 Case C256/01, Allonby, para 71, recalled in para 35 of FNV Kunsten. 
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as workers under its Allonby doctrine, and in this sense it may well be 
arguable, as we did in the introductory paragraph of this section, that FNV 
Kunsten seemingly offers a compromise, or a synthesis between the 
Albany and Pavlov approaches.   However, as we are about to contend in 
the following section, it also reinforces that antithesis, and the crude 
dichotomy between subordination and business related economic activity. 
 
4. Collective representation and collective bargaining rights of self-
employed workers – a supranational perspective.  
 
The two authors of this article, both jointly and individually, have 
devoted a considerable amount of their research to the critical 
understanding of the binary divide between employment and self-
employment. The regression of this divide to one between subordinate 
work on the one hand and business activity on the other is, 
unsurprisingly, of considerable concern to us. This new divide would 
inevitably have the effect of depriving a large segment of working people 
of their rights to collective representation and collective bargaining in a 
way that is inconsistent with the normative development – let alone the 
normative foundations - of labour law. 
 
In terms of labour law’s normative development, it may be interesting to 
reflect upon the on-going dispute affecting the Irish CTU (ICTU) and the 
Irish Government (and in particular the Competition Authority of Ireland) 
in respect of the attempts by various unions (Equity and the NUJ) 
representing self-employed/freelance professionals to set collectively 
agreed terms and conditions of pay with a number of national and 
regional employers in the media industry.  In 2004, the Competition 
Authority went as far as declaring unlawful and collective agreement 
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between Equity/SITP and the Institute of Advertising Practitioners,34 on 
the ground ‘that self-employed actors are undertakings and that Equity is 
an association of undertakings when it acts on behalf of self-employed 
actors’ and as such subject to national competition law, rather than 
covered by the scope of the Industrial Relations Act. The Irish 
Government, having initially agreed to amend the Irish Competiton Act 
to exclude freelance journalists, session musicians and voice-over actors 
from its coverage, has hitherto systematically refused to introduce an 
exclusion and motivated its stance by reference to EU competition law 
(and EU/IMF Bailout) requirements. These disputes have reached the 
ILO’s CEACR, that, since 2009, has systematically requested the Irish 
Government to comply with its obligations under Convention C-98.35 In 
its observations of 2015, as published in the 2016 ILC Session, it went as 
far as stating explicitly that  
 
‘Article 4 of the Convention establishes the principle of free and 
voluntary collective bargaining and the autonomy of the bargaining 
parties with respect to all workers and employers covered by the 
Convention. As regards the self-employed, the Committee recalls, 
in its 2012 General Survey on the fundamental Conventions, 
paragraph 209, that the right to collective bargaining should also 
cover organizations representing the self-employed’.36  
  
                                                 
34 http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/e_04_002%20Actors%20Fees.pdf  
35 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13101:0::NO::P13101_COMMENT_ID:308
2151 and 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3082151 
36 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13101:0::NO::P13101_COMMENT_ID:308
2151  
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The dispute has recently culminated in a Complaint being lodged before 
the European Committee for Social Rights (ECSR) by the ICTU.37 The 
complaint persuasively argues that ‘self-employed workers who are not 
sole-traders in business on their own account should not be regarded as 
business undertakings but as workers engaged under a different form of 
contract’.38 However it also added that ‘Such an analysis would not 
preclude the application of Article 101 to sole-traders who are genuinely 
carrying on a business of their own without subordination to the 
individual customer or client’.39 This qualification is of course tactically 
important, given the EU’s established jurisprudence in Pavlov and FNV 
Kunsten. But it may be adding an additional restrictive jurisprudential 
gloss to the seemingly broader and more universalistic approach taken by 
other international bodies, for instance the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association, that expressly require Members states to  
 
‘hold consultations to this end with all the parties involved with the 
aim of finding a mutually acceptable solution so as to ensure that 
workers who are self-employed could fully enjoy trade union rights 
under Conventions Nos 87 and 98 for the purpose of furthering and 
defending their interest, including by the means of collective 
bargaining [and] in consultation with the social partners 
concerned, to identify the particularities of self-employed workers 
that have a bearing on collective bargaining so as to develop 
specific collective bargaining mechanisms relevant to self-
employed workers, if appropriate’40 
 
                                                 
37 Irish Congress of Trade Unions v. Ireland, Complaint No 123/2016, 10 October 2016. 
38 Para 133, page 55. 
39 Para 133, pp 55-56. 
40 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (2012) Report No. 363, Case 2602, para 461. See further 
in the same report the recommendations in paras 508 and 1085-1087. Emphasis added. 
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There is undoubtedly a genuine case to be made for encouraging bodies 
such as the ECSR to develop a line of interpretative precedents that 
superimposes an autonomous worker definition on work relations that 
national authorities may have classified as business undertakings, 
genuinely self-employed, or sui generis relations that fall outside the 
scope of national labour law systems. But, arguably, it may be equally 
important to aspire to the development of more universalistic approaches 
in respect of the personal scope of application of particular fundamental 
labour rights, that ought to be enjoyed by all workers, including those 
offering personal work or services without a link of subordination to 
individual customers or clients. This is particularly so when, as in the 
case of freedom of association and collective bargaining, bodies such as 
the ILO CEACR and the ILO CFA have consistently argued that 
‘workers who are self-employed [should] fully enjoy trade union rights 
under Conventions Nos 87 and 98 for the purpose of furthering and 
defending their interest, including by the means of collective 
bargaining’.41  
 
The ECSR has notably already extended the scope of application of some 
of the Charter’s provision beyond the traditional binary divide between 
employment and self-employment. For instance, according to the 
Committee, ‘for the purposes of Article 3§1 of the Charter, all workers, 
including non-employees, must be covered by health and safety at work 
regulations.… . . . [The European Committee on Social Rights] has 
consistently maintained this interpretation, on the grounds that employed 
and non-employed workers are normally exposed to the same risks in this 
area’.42 This is a fertile line of reasoning that ought to be deployed to 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions XVI-2 (Austria), (Strasbourg, 2005), 11. 
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other risks inherent to all work relations and to various other areas of 
employment protection legislation that seek to eliminate or redistribute 
such risks in a more equitable way. 
 
5. Collective bargaining rights and the Labour v Capital divide in 21st 
century personal work relations. 
 
In the previous section it was argued that collective bargaining rights 
ought to be extended across the binary divide and so that they would be 
enjoyed by employed and self-employed workers alike. This suggestion 
was developed on the basis of a critique of the rather crude and, in our 
view, unprincipled distinction between worker and undertaking 
developed by the CJEU, and of the certainly more universalistic 
aspirations of other international interpretative bodies that clearly seek to 
expand the scope of application of at least some labour rights, including 
collective bargaining, beyond employment. We noted, for instance, that 
the ILO CFA is willing to recognise such rights even to self-employed 
persons such as self-employed heavy goods vehicle drivers that, 
according to national authorities, ‘have the ownership of the vehicles, 
work independently without specific supervision and oversight by the 
company and bear overall costs incurred on the job’,43 and many would 
therefore perceive as entrepreneurs, endowed with their own capital,  and 
often providing their services to multiple clients or customers. Can an 
extension of labour rights, even fundamental labour rights such as 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, really be argued and 
justified in respect of these subjects? 
 
                                                 
43 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (2012) Report No. 363, Case 2602, para 449.  
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In other, jointly written work, we have argued that labour rights ought to 
be guaranteed across a broader spectrum of ‘personal work relations’.44 In 
an attempt to redraw the scope of application of labour law in a more 
principled and just way, we sought to trace its limits by reference to the 
idea of personality. In this context we noted that our concept of 
personality (and of personal work relations broadly) ‘goes to the 
exclusion of those service providers who are not operating mainly and 
predominantly on the basis of their personal work, but rather primarily 
through their ability to organize other factors of production (and often the 
factors of production of others), labour and capital in particular. The 
ability to do so, we believe, makes the person akin to an employer or a 
commercial entrepreneur, or both, even where some degree of personal 
work may be present in the actual activity performed’.45 
 
We remain of the view, expressed already in 2011, that labour law should 
remain committed to protecting workers whose ‘personal work 
overwhelmingly shapes the service provided, over and above the amount 
of capital that he or she may be availing herself of to assist him or her, 
which ought to be marginal and ancillary’.46 But we feel we ought to 
clarify the extent to which, in modern day work arrangements, capital can 
often remain marginal or ancillary to the provision of labour even when it 
is of essence to the personal work or service provided. We endeavour to 
do so by reference to the case of the many workers making a living in the 
so-called collaborative or gig-economy,47 often relying on assets and 
                                                 
44 Freedland Kountouris 2011. 
45 Freedland Kountouris 2011, p 376. 
46 Ibid.  
47 V. De Strefano, ‘The Rise of the "Just-in-Time Workforce": On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and 
Labor Protection in the "Gig Economy"’ (2016) CLLPJ,; J. Prassl and M. Risak, ‘Uber, Taskrabbit, and 
Co.: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork’ (2016) CLLPJ, 619. 
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other forms of capital that are hardly negligible and many could see as 
not exactly marginal. 
 
The recent judgment by the London Employment Tribunal in Aslam and 
Farrar v Uber48 helpfully reminds us of the considerable capital 
investment required by drivers seeking to provide their services through 
the company Uber. ‘The driver supplies the vehicle’.49 The driver is also 
responsible for all costs incidental to owning and running the vehicle, 
including fuel, repairs, maintenance, MOT inspections, road tax and 
insurance’.50 Drivers who own smartphones have free access to the App. 
Those who do not may hire one from [Uber]’.51 Such levels of capital 
investment on the part of a driver have been typically understood as, in 
and of themselves, pointing away from employment and towards a 
contract of carriage performed by an independent contractor.52 Typically, 
the ‘ownership of the assets’ is a key factor that will frustrate the 
successful deployment of a number of key ‘employment status’ tests and 
indicators, for instance the business integration test often in conjunction 
with the economic reality test, and often result in an assumption that a the 
driver-owner is subject to little or no control on the part of the putative 
employer.53  
 
It is our view that it is possible and useful to offer a different perspective 
on this type of, seemingly capital intensive, personal work relations by 
reference to two important points. The first point is that an analysis of the 
nature of a work or other economic relation in abstracto and when the 
                                                 
48 Aslam and Farrar v Uber B.V,  Case No 2202550/2015 of 28 October 2016. 
49 Aslam v Uber, para 44. 
50 Para 45. 
51 Para 46. 
52 The classic example of this approach being that taken in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd. v. 
Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497 at 525-526. 
53 Ibid. See also the cases cited in Aslam v Uber esp at paras 81-82. 
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parties of the relationship are not engaging in the actual activity being 
assessed is, to say the least, an artificial and unproductive exercise. So for 
instance, it is artificial and unproductive to pass judgment on the status of 
a ‘driver owner’ unless that driver is actually performing the service on 
behalf or for a particular party and in furtherance to a particular 
arrangement. In abstracto, the owner of a taxi, or goods vehicle, or other 
similar substantial asset is almost by definition bound to be perceived as a 
small entrepreneur, or an undertaking, and not a personal work or service 
provider, relying on considerable assets, or on assets of considerable 
value. But when the various parties to an arrangement actually engage 
through that complex set of contractual and non-contractual nexuses and 
relations that underpin the functioning of the Uber model, in other words 
‘when the App is switched on, the legal analysis is, we think, different’.54 
 
When the App is switched on - and this is our second point - when the 
owner-driver is actually performing her or his service then, in our view, 
the personal nature of the work relationship comes through very neatly 
indeed. Each particular ride, each particular ‘driving service’ or series of 
services, is manifestly predominantly characterised by the provision of 
personal work rather than by the availability of capital assets and their 
being supplied to third parties. Capital assets are of course not irrelevant, 
but they are ancillary to the provision of the service and, overall, quite 
marginal, even considering additional capital costs such as fuel, asset 
depreciation, insurance, and servicing. At the end of the working day, the 
driver will have received payments that, if broken down, overwhelmingly 
derive from the units of personal work and labour provided rather than 
from the fraction of capital deployed or consumed for and in the course of 
the performance of the service in that particular day. The driver’s 
                                                 
54 Aslam v Uber, para 86. 
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contribution to the service reveals itself as being, mainly, one of personal 
work, rather than capital. The driver is thus performing his work or 
services under a personal work relation, and not as a business 
undertaking. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The present article has largely concentrated on the extent to which self-
employed workers may be entitled to ‘collective labour rights’, and in 
particular to the right to bargain collectively. We began our enquiry by 
arguing for a more inclusive normative understanding of collective labour 
law as essentially part of or continuous with the embodiment of  
fundamental claims to freedom of association and democratic 
representation claims in the general political constitution.  
 
There is a generalised understanding, with regard to collective labour law 
in the UK that the ‘worker’ definition contained in TULRCA s. 296 does 
sustain quite an inclusive concept of the worker which embraces a broad 
range of individuals, including self-employed workers, who contract to 
provide personal services, except for those who do so as a professional to 
a client. Unlike the ‘worker’ definition in the individual rights context of 
the National Minimum Wage Act, it does not go on to exclude those who 
provide their services as a business to a customer. We noted that this 
slightly broader scope is sustained by a careful reading of a number of 
international instruments, including Recommendation R-198 and 
Conventions C-87 and C-98;  but this approach is clearly rejected by EU 
competition law, which tends to regard non-subordinate workers 
engaging in collective relations as undertakings potentially acting in 
restraint of trade, without regard to the question of whether they may be 
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acting as professionals or businesses. By contrast, the ILO supervisory 
bodies seem to us to suggest that self-employed workers ought to be 
entitled to collective bargaining rights, without regard to whether they are 
acting as professionals to clients or businesses to customers.  We submit 
that this more expansive approach accords better with the inclusive 
normative framework for which we have argued. This approach is clearly 
hard to reconcile with the more restrictive approaches which we have 
encountered, in the course of this article in various area of UK domestic55 
and European law. 
 
Our more inclusive normative framework has its roots in our earlier work 
which has been developed around the concept of personal work relations 
and their legal regulation. From that starting point, section 5 explored the 
extent to which it may be justifiable to leave outside the scope of 
application of collective labour law such personal work relations as are 
accompanied by a seemingly substantive asset and capital contribution, as  
is often the case in many of the work relations prevailing in the so-called 
collaborative economy. We concluded that for most of these relations, the 
‘slices’ of capital necessary for the actual provision of each service are 
such as to appear marginal and ancillary to the element of personal work 
that overwhelmingly shapes the provision itself.  
 
Other articles in this symposium have in various ways pursued Bob 
Simpson’s special interest in collective labour law.  This one has sought 
to follow that pre-occupation into an aspect of labour/employment law 
which is all too readily perceived as a purely individual one, namely the 
question of its ‘personal’ or relational scope.  This represents a leap into 
rather unfamiliar territory, in which the explorer might easily feel rather 
                                                 
55 A further recent instance is to be found in Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 209.  
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lonely and misunderstood.  Arguments for an approach to personal scope 
which is specially inclusive by reference to collective labour rights are 
apt to seem out of place or even counter-intuitive in a jurisprudence of 
personal scope which has primarily been developed outside the zone of 
collective labour law and moreover with a considerable insouciance with 
regard to collective labour law.  It is unlikely that our arguments will 
have succeeded in countering that insouciance, but we hope that they may 
have placed the questions of freedom of association, freedom to take 
industrial action, and rights to collective bargaining, very firmly on the 
table of the personal scope discussion.   This would seem to be a minimal 
and we hope compelling normative claim in a period when 
labour/employment law faces an intense struggle to adapt itself to the 
great turn towards ‘flexible’, precarious, and often deceptively 
autonomous patterns of personal work contract or personal work relation. 
 
